Result of participation in a proceedings without showing protest or objection

State Bank of India vs. Ram Das : (2003) 12 SCC 474

It is an established view of law that where a party despite knowledge of the defect in the jurisdiction or bias or malice of an arbitrator participated in the proceedings without any kind of objection, by his conduct it disentitles itself from raising such a question in the subsequent proceedings. What we find is that the appellant despite numerous opportunities made available to it, although it was aware of the defect in the award of the umpire, at no stage made out any case of bias against the umpire. We, therefore, find that the appellant cannot be permitted to raise the question of bias for the first time before this Court.

Union of India vs. S. Vinodh Kumar : (2007) 8 SCC100 has held :-

It is also well settled that those candidates who had taken part in the selection process knowing fully well procedure laid down therein were not entitled to the same.

automatic suspension of the execution of the award

But then we noticed from the mandatory language of section 34 of the 1996 Act, that an award, when challenged under section 34 within the time stipulated therein, becomes unexecutable. There is no discretion left with the court to pass any interlocutory order in regard to the said award except to adjudicate on the correctness of the claim made by the applicant therein. Therefore, that being the legislative intent, any direction from us contrary to that, also becomes impermissible. On facts of this case, there being no exceptional situation which would compel us to ignore such statutory provision, and to use our jurisdiction under Article 142, we restrain ourselves from passing any such order, as prayed for by the applicant.
However, we do notice that this automatic suspension of the execution of the award, the moment an application challenging the said award is filed under section 34 of the Act leaving no discretion in the court to put the parties on terms, in our opinion, defeats the very objective of the alternate dispute resolution system to which arbitration belongs. We do find that there is a recommendation made by the concerned Ministry to the Parliament to amend section 34 with a proposal to empower the civil court to pass suitable interim orders in such cases. In view of the urgency of such amendment, we sincerely hope that necessary steps would be taken by the authorities concerned at the earliest to bring about the required change in law

Limitation act applicable to A & C Act 1996

AC Act is no doubt, a special law, consolidating and amending the law relating to arbitration and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. AC Act does not prescribe the period of limitation, for various proceedings under that Act, except where it intends to prescribe a period different from what is prescribed in the Limitation Act. On the other hand, Section 43 makes the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to Proceedings - both in court and in arbitration - under the AC Act. There is also no express exclusion of application of any provision of the Limitation Act to proceedings under AC Act, but there are some specific departures from the general provisions of Limitation Act, as for example, the proviso to section 34(3) and sub-sections (2) to (4) of section 43 of the AC Act. Where the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes a period of limitation for appeals or applications to any court, and the special or local law provides for filing of appeals and applications to the court, but does not prescribe any period of limitation in regard to such appeals or applications, the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act will apply to such appeals or applications and consequently the provisions of sections 4 to 24 will also apply. Where the special or local law prescribes for any appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act, then the provisions of section 29(2) will be attracted. In that event, the provisions of section 3 of Limitation Act will apply, as if the period of limitation prescribed under the special law was the period prescribed by the Schedule to Limitation Act, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for the appeal or application by the special law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 will apply to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special law. The object of section 29(2) is to ensure that the principles contained in sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act apply to suits, appeals and applications filed in a court under special or local laws also, even if it prescribes a period of limitation different from what is prescribed in the Limitation Act, except to the extent of express exclusion of the application of any or all of those provisions.

judgment on Section 141of N. I. Act

In S.M.S Pharmaceuticals [(2005)8
SCC 89], a three Judge Bench of this Court examined
the scope and ambit of Section 141 of the Act and the 6
liability created with respect to the Directors and other
persons responsible for the affairs of the company.
Three questions were posed:
"(a) Whether for purposes of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, it is sufficient if the substance of the allegation read as a whole fulfill the requirements of the said section and it is not necessary to specifically state in the complaint that the person accused was in charge of, or responsible for, the conduct of the business of the company.

(b) Whether a director of a company would be deemed to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for conduct of the business of the company and, therefore, deemed to be guilty of the offence unless he proves to the contrary.
(c) Even if it is held that specific averments are necessary, whether in the absence of such averments the signatory of the cheque and or the managing directors or joint managing director who admittedly would be in charge of the company and responsible to the company for conduct of its business could be proceeded against."

The above questions were answered in the following terms: 7
(a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141 that at the time offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averments is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied.
(b) The answer to the question posed in sub-para (b) has to be in the negative. Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under section 141 of the Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The requirement of Section 141 is that the person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a director in such cases.
(c) The answer to Question ( C ) has to be in the affirmative. The question notes that the managing director or joint managing director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the Act. By virtue of the office they hold as managing director or joint managing director, these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Therefore, 8
they get covered under Section 141. So far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141."

International arbitration

Whenever in an interpretation clause, the word "means" is used the same must be given a restrictive meaning

disputes relating to specific performance of a contract can be referred to arbitration

Ms.Ruma Pal,J. observed: .....merely because the sections of the SpecificRelief Act confer discretion on courts to grant specificperformance of a contract does nto means that parties cannotagree that the discretion will be exercised by a forum oftheir choice. If the converse were true, then whenever arelief is dependent upon the exercise of discretion of acourt by statute e.g. the grant of interest or costs,parties chould be precluded from referring the dispute toarbitration.
We agree with this reasoning. We hold on Point 3 that disputes relating to specific performance of a contract can be referred to arbitration and Section 34(2)(b)(i) is not attracted

restrictive/negative covenants

The result of the above discussion is that considerations against restrictive covenants are different in cases where the restriction is to apply during the period after the termination of the contract than those in cases where it is to operate during the period of the contract. Negative covenants operative during the period of the contract of employment when the employee is bound to serve his employer exclusively are generally not regarded as restraint of trade and therefore do not fall under section 27 of the Contract Act. A negative covenant that the employee would not engage himself in a trade or business or would not get himself employed by any other master for whom he would perform similar or substantially similar duties is not therefore a restraint of trade unless the contract as aforesaid is unconscionable or excessively harsh or unreasonable or one sided as in the case of W.H. Milsted and Son Ltd.(3).

JUDGMENT ON LIMITATION

Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction. On analysis of the said Section, it becomes evident that the following conditions must be satisfied before Section 14 can be pressed into service:
(1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party;
(2) The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith;
(3) The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature;
(4) The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue and;(5) Both the proceedings are in a court.

To attract the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, five conditions enumerated in the earlier part of this Judgment have to co-exist. There is no manner of doubt that the section deserves to be construed liberally. Due diligence and caution are essentially pre-requisites for attracting Section 14. Due diligence cannot be measured by any absolute standards. Due diligence is a measure of prudence or activity expected from and ordinarily exercised by a reasonable and prudent person under the particular circumstances.
The definition of good faith as found in Section 2(h) of the Limitation Act would indicate that nothing shall be deemed to be in good faith which is not done with due care and attention