the matter in respect of which the respondent sought reference to arbitration was "excepted matter" in terms of

the following principlesrelating to "Excepting matters" as under :- "1. These appeals by the grant of Special Leave pertains to the effect of the usual `excepted clause' vis-`-vis the arbitration clause in a Government contract. While it is true and as has been contended, that the authorization of the arbitrators to arbitrate, flows from the agreement but the High Court in the judgment impugned thought it fit to direct adjudication of `excepted matters' in the agreement itself by the arbitrators and hence these appeals before this Court. 2. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that in the usual Government contracts, the reference to which would be made immediately hereafter, there is exclusion of some matters from the purview of arbitration and a senior officer of the Department usually is given the authority and power to adjudicate the same. The clause itself records that the decision of the senior officer, being the adjudicator, shall be final and binding between the parties - this is what popularly known as `excepted matters' in a Government or Governmental agencies' contract. 3. `Excepted matters' obviously, as the parties agreed, do not require any further adjudication since the agreement itself provides a named adjudicator - concurrence to the same obviously is presumed by reason of the unequivocal acceptance of the terms of the contract by 11 the parties and this is where the courts have found our lacking in its jurisdiction to entertain an application for reference to arbitration as regards the disputes arising therefrom and it has been the consistent view that in the event the claims arising within the ambit of excepted matters, question of assumption of jurisdiction of any arbitrator either with or without the intervention of the court would not arise; the parties themselves have decided to have the same adjudicated by a particular officer in regard to these matters; what are these exceptions however are questions of fact and usually mentioned in the contract documents and forms part of the agreement as such there is no ambiguity in the matter of adjudication of these specialized matters and termed in the agreement as the excepted matters....."

REQUIREMENT OF rule 4 order 37 cpc

Where on an application, more than one among the specified reliefs
may be granted by the Court all such reliefs must be claimed in one application. It
is not permissible to claim such reliefs in successive petitions as it would be
contrary to the letter and spirit of the provision. That is why where an application
under Rule 4 of Order 37 is filed to set aside a decree either because the defendant
did not appear in response to summons and limitation expired, or having appeared,
did not apply for leave to defend the suit in the prescribed period, the Court is
empowered to grant leave to defendant to appear to the summons and to defend the
suit in the same application. It is, therefore, not enough for the defendant to show
special circumstances which prevented him from appearing or applying for leave
to defend, he has also to show by affidavit or otherwise, facts which would entitle
him leave to defend the suit. In this respect, Rule 4 of Order 37 is different from
Rule 13 of Order 9.”





Indeed, an application under Order 37 Rule 4 CPC differs vis-a- vis an
application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC for the reason an application under Order
37 Rule 4 CPC is a composite application determination whereof, if in favour of
the applicant, results in not only the ex-parte decree being set aside but leave to
defend being granted to the party concerned. It is for this reason law requires that
the defendant, in addition to show special circumstances which prevented him/her
from appearing, must additionally disclose facts entitling him/her to obtain leave to
defend.

Service of notice/summons U/O 37 CPC

O. 37 CPC specifically provides that in a suit under O. 37 CPC, the plaintiff shall together with the summons under Rule 2, serve the defendant with a copy of the plaint and annexure thereto. Thus where only summons have been affixed without affixing copy of the plaint and annexures thereto, the service is not in accordance with the provisions of O. 37 Rule 3 (1) CPC and this would be a sufficient ground to set aside the decree. The same view is taken by another bench of this Court in the case of New Bank of India Vs. M/s Master Steel Marketing Co.-1995 III AD (Delhi) 957. It was a case of the substituted service. It was held that where only copy of summons was published without publishing copy of the plaint and annexures there to, the service was not in accordance with law.

ORDER 37 RULE 3 (4 & 5) of C P C.

The question as to whether leave to defend a suit can be granted or not is within the discretionary powers of the High Court and it does not appear to us that such discretion has been exercised erroneously or with any irregularity which warrants interference by this Court.


it is now well established as a principle of law that even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction to pass an order in such cases, the revisional Court will not interfere with such an order unless a jurisdictional error is pointed out and established by the person who questions such order.

In the instant case, the High Court did not lack jurisdiction to pass an order with regard to the subject matter of dispute, though the order itself may be incorrect. There is, therefore, little scope for this Court to interfere with.

Whether quashing of FIR/criminal proceedings/complaint be allowed

The question whether a F I R under Sections 420/468/471/34/120-B IPC can be quashed either under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Article 226 of the Constitution, when the accused and the complainant have compromised and settled the matter between themselves ?


We, accordingly, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and quash the criminal proceedings pending before Court.

MODE OF SERVICE

Admittedly, notice under Section 138B of theNegotiable Instruments Act was sent to therespondents through registered post and under acertificate of posting on their correct address of therespondents. The High Court had quashedproceeding on the ground that although noticethrough registered post and also under certificate ofposting were sent by the appellant/ complainant tothe respondents but because of the endorsement ofthe postal peon, the service could not be said tohave been effected. In our view, the High Court wasnot justified in holding that service of notice couldnot be found to be valid. In K.Bhaskaran vs.Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan & Anr. [1999 (7) SCC510], it has been held that the context of section138B of the Negotiable Instruments Act invites aliberal interpretation favouring the person who hasthe statutory obligation to give notice under the Actbecause he must be presumed to be the loser in thetransaction and provision itself has been made in 3 his interest and if a strict interpretation is asked forthat would give a handle to the trickster chequedrawer. It is also well settled that once notice hasbeen sent by registered post with acknowledgmentdue in a correct address, it must be presumed thatthe service has been made effective. We do not findfrom the endorsement of the postal peon that thepostal peon was at all examined. In V. Raja Kumarivs. P. Subbarama Naidu & Anr. [2004 (8) SCC 774],again this Court reiterated the same principle andheld that the statutory notice under Sections 138and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881sent to the correct address of the drawer butreturning with the endorsement must be presumedto be served to the drawer and the burden to showthat the accused drawee had managed to get anincorrect postal endorsement letter on thecomplainant and affixed thereof have to beconsidered during trial on the background facts ofthe case.

arbitration clause

This appeal is directed against the Judgment and order for appointment of an Arbitrator on the ground that no Arbitration Clause was in existence between the parties.

It was held by the learned Addl. District Judge, that since the photocopy of the proposed agreement bears the signature of only the appellant and not that of the PGI, it could not be held that an arbitration agreement was executed between the parties and since there was no signature of the PGI on the said agreement, which was sent after signature of the appellant, remained only as an offer.

We may reiterate that in this case admittedly the documents which are on record apparently show supply of the material by the appellant to the PGI and acceptance thereof by the PGI in pursuance of the tender enquiry by them wherein tender of the appellant containing the arbitration clause was admittedly accepted by the PGI. Accordingly, we hold that arbitration agreement did exist and, therefore, dispute between the parties would be referred to an
Arbitrator for decision.

Therefore, considering the above aspects of the matter in this case, we must come to this conclusion that although no formal agreement was executed, the ender documents indicating certain conditions of contract contained an arbitration clause. It is also an admitted position that the appellant gave his tender offer which was accepted and the appellant acted upon it.

Insurance — whether a dispute raised by an insured, after giving a full and final discharge voucher to the insurer, can be referred to arbitration

When a contract contains an arbitration clause and any dispute in respect of the said contract is referred to arbitration without the intervention of the court, the Arbitral Tribunal can decide the following questions affecting its jurisdiction: (a) whether there is an arbitration agreement; (b) whether the arbitration agreement is valid; (c) whether the contract in which the arbitration clause is found is null and void and if so whether the invalidity extends to the Arbitration clause also.

It follows therefore that if the respondent before the Arbitral Tribunal contends that the contract has been discharged by reason of the claimant accepting payment made by the respondent in full and final settlement, and if the claimant counters it by contending that the discharge voucher was extracted from him by practicing fraud, undue influence, or coercion, the arbitral tribunal will have to decide whether the discharge of contract was vitiated by any circumstance which rendered the discharge voidable at the instance of the claimant. If the arbitral tribunal comes to the conclusion that there was a valid discharge by voluntary execution of a discharge voucher, it will refuse to examine the claim on merits, and reject the claim as not maintainable.

In what circumstances, a court will refuse to refer a dispute relating toquantum to arbitration, when the contract specifically provides forreference of disputes and differences relating to the quantum toarbitration?

a three Judge Bench of this Court culled out the following general principles as to when arbitration agreements operate and when they do not operate:

maintenance under Section 125 of the Code

Three questions arise for our consideration;

(i) whether interim maintenance could be awarded in absence of specific express provision in the Code;

(ii) whether the applicant-wife and her daughter are entitled to maintenance from the date of the order passed by the Family Court or from the date of application made by them under Section 125 of the Code; and

(iii) what could be the amount of maintenance which could be awarded by the
Court.

This appeal is filed against the order passed by

On the contentions raised, the following questions arise for our consideration : (i) Whether informed consent of a patient is necessary for surgical procedure involving removal of reproductive organs? If so what is the nature of such consent ?
(ii) When a patient consults a medical practitioner, whether consent given for diagnostic surgery, can be construed as consent for performing additional or further surgical procedure -- either as conservative treatment or as radical treatment -- without the specific consent for such additional or further surgery.
(iii) Whether there was consent by the appellant, for the abdominal hysterectomy and Bilateral Salpingo-oopherectomy (for short AH-BSO) performed by the respondent?
(iv) Whether the respondent had falsely invented a case that appellant was suffering from endometriosis to explain the unauthorized and unwarranted removal of uterus and ovaries, and whether such radical surgery was either to cover-up negligence in conducting diagnostic laparoscopy or to claim a higher fee ?
(v) Even if appellant was suffering from endometriosis, the respondent ought to have resorted to conservative treatment/surgery instead of performing radical surgery ?
(vi) Whether the Respondent is guilty of the tortious act of negligence/battery amounting to deficiency in service, and consequently liable to pay damages to the appellant

principles for grant or refusal to grant of injunction to restrain enforcement of a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit

From the discussions made hereinabove relating to the principles for grant or refusal to grant of injunction to restrain enforcement of a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit, we find that the following principles should be noted in the matter of injunction to restrain the encashment of a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit :-
(i) While dealing with an application for injunction in the course of commercial dealings, and when an unconditional Bank Guarantee or Letter of Credit is given or accepted, the Beneficiary is entitled to realize such a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit in terms thereof irrespective of any pending disputes relating to the terms of the contract.
(ii) The Bank giving such guarantee is bound to honour it as per its terms irrespective of any dispute raised by its customer.
(iii) The Courts should be slow in granting an order of injunction to restrain the realization of a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit.
(iv) Since a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit is an independent and a separate contract and is absolute in nature, the existence of any dispute between the parties to the contract is not a ground for issuing an order of injunction to restrain enforcement of Bank Guarantees or Letters of Credit.(v) Fraud of an egregious nature which would vitiate the very foundation of such a Bank Guarantee or Letter of Credit and the beneficiary seeks to take advantage of the situation.
(vi) Allowing encashment of an unconditional Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit would result in irretrievable harm or injustice to one of the parties concerned.

definition of Misconduct

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 6835 of 2000

PETITIONER:
Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India & Ors

RESPONDENT:
Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/05/2007
………………………………………………………….
Somewhere in this matter is held:
We are herein concerned with the term 'misconduct'. The word
'misconduct' which in generic sense would mean, as held in Probodh Kumar
Bhowmick v. University of Calcutta and Ors. 1994 (2) C.L.J. 456 is as
under:

"Misconduct, inter alia, envisages breach of discipline,
although it would not be possible to lay down
exhaustively as to what would constitute conduct and
indiscipline, which, however, wide enough to include
wrongful omission or commission whether done or
omitted to be done intentionally or unintentionally. It
means, 'improper behaviour; intentional wrong doing on
deliberate violation of a rule of standard or behaviour':

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, where no discretion is left except
what necessity may demand; it is a violation of definite
law a forbidden act. It differs from carelessness.
Misconduct even if it is an offence under the Indian
Penal Code is equally a misconduct."

[See also State of Punjab and Others v. Ram Singh Ex. Constable - AIR
1992 SC 2188 : (1992) 4 SCC 54 and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India
(1995) 6 SCC 749].

Interpretation of law is the job of the superior court. An opinion of an
expert is not beyond the pale of judicial review. It would certainly not be so
when the statutory authority transgresses its jurisdiction. A decision taken in
excess of jurisdiction would render the same a nullity. [See Vasu Dev Singh
& Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. 2006 (11) SCALE 108]

If a notification issued under a statute is a law within the meaning of
Article 13(3)(a) of the Constitution, the same is liable to be struck down if it
is contrary to any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution of India. [See Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private
Ltd. and Others v. Union of India and Others, (1985) 1 SCC 641]. In our
opinion the notification dated 03.08.1989 issued by respondent No.1 violates
Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution and is hereby quashed.

What constitutes a reasonable notice by an arbitrator

For constituting a reasonable opportunity, the following conditions are required to be observed :

1. Each party must have notice that the hearing is to take place.
2. Each party must have a reasonable opportunity to be present at the hearing, together with his advisers and witnesses.
3. Each party must have the opportunity to be present throughout the hearing
4. Each party must have a reasonable opportunity to present evidence and argument in support of his own case.
5. Each party must have a reasonable opportunity to test his opponent's case by cross-examining his witnesses, presenting rebutting evidence and addressing oral argument.
6. The hearing must, unless the contrary is expressly agreed, be the occasion on which the parties present the whole of their evidence and argument.

Indian nationals should not be permitted to derogate from Indian law

Determination of nationality of the parties plays a crucial role in the matter of appointment of an arbitrator. A company incorporated in India can only have Indian nationality for the purpose of the Act. It cannot be said that a company incorporated in India does not have an Indian nationality. Hence, where both parties have Indian nationalities, then the arbitration between such parties cannot be said to be an international commercial arbitration.

Section 28 of the 1996 Act is imperative in character in view of Section 2(6) thereof, which excludes the same from those provisions which parties derogate from (if so provided by the Act). The intention of the legislature appears to be clear that Indian nationals should not be permitted to derogate from Indian law. This is part of the public policy of the country

a provision made in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is not an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the dispute

What are the ingredients which constitute a criminal breach of trust to enable an aggrieved party to launch criminal proceedings against the accused? What is the effect of an arbitration clause in an Agreement when criminal proceedings have been initiated against the other parties to the Agreement?
Answer:
In Trisuns Chemical Industry vs. Rajesh Agarwal dealing with the effect of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement on criminal prosecution on the ground that civil proceedings are also maintainable, the Supreme Court has held that quashing of FIR or a complaint exercising power under Section 482 CrPC should be limited to a very extreme exception; merely because an act has a civil profile is not enough to stop action on the criminal side. It was further held that a provision made in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is not an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act constitutes a criminal offence.

the expression accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers

In our opinion, if we adopt a restrictive meaning to the expression accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers in Section 123(c) of the Railways Act, we will be depriving a large number of railway passengers from getting compensation in railway accidents. It is well known that in our country there are crores of people who travel by railway trains since everybody cannot afford traveling by air or in a private car. By giving a restrictive and narrow meaning to the expression we will be depriving a large number of victims of train accidents (particularly poor and middle class people) from getting compensation under the Railways Act. Hence, in our opinion, the expression accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers includes accidents when a bona fide passenger i.e. a passenger traveling with a valid ticket or pass is trying to enter into a railway train and falls down during the process. In other words, a purposive, and not literal, interpretation should be given to the expression.

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OIL & NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD. v. SAW PIPES LTD

The Court shall not exercise its power to set aside or to declare an award to be of no effect, in whole or in part, unless it is satisfied that it would be inappropriate to remit the matters in question to the tribunal for reconsideration.

In the result, it is held that:-
A. (1) The Court can set aside the arbitral award under Section 34(2) of the Act if the party making the application furnishes proof that:-
(i) a party was under some incapacity, or
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or
(iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration;
2) The Court may set aside the award:-

(i) (a) if the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties,

(b) failing such agreement, the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with Part-I of the Act.
(ii) if the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with:-
(a) the agreement of the parties, or (b) failing such agreement, the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with Part-I of the Act.
However, exception for setting aside the award on the ground of composition of arbitral tribunal or illegality of arbitral procedure is that the agreement should not be in conflict with the provisions of Part-I of the Act from which parties cannot derogate.
(c) If the award passed by the arbitral tribunal is in contravention of
provisions of the Act or any other substantive law governing the parties or is against the terms of the contract.
(3) The award could be set aside if it is against the public policy of India, that is to say, if it is contrary to:-
(a) fundamental policy of Indian law; (b) the interest of India; or
(c) justice or morality, or (d) if it is patently illegal.
(4) It could be challenged:-
(a) as provided under Section 13(5); and (b) Section 16(6) of the Act.
B. (1) The impugned award requires to be set aside mainly on the grounds:-
(i) there is specific stipulation in the agreement that the time and date of delivery of the goods was the essence of the contract;
(ii) in case of failure to deliver the goods within the period fixed for such delivery in the schedule, ONGC was entitled to recover from the contractor liquidated damages as agreed;
(iii) it was also explicitly understood that the agreed liquidated damages were genuine pre-estimate of damages;
(iv) on the request of the respondent to extend the time limit for supply of goods, ONGC informed specifically that time was extended but stipulated liquidated damages as agreed would be recovered;
(v) liquidated damages for delay in supply of goods were to be recovered by paying authorities from the bills for payment of cost of material supplied by the contractor;
(vi) there is nothing on record to suggest that stipulation for recovering liquidated damages was by way of penalty or that the said sum was in any way unreasonable.
(vii) In certain contracts, it is impossible to assess the damages or prove the same. Such situation is taken care by Sections 73 and 74 of the Contract Act and in the present case by specific terms of the contract

service of notice

Modifying the decree of the High Court, this Court, HELD:

1. Where the findings by the Court of facts are vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by an essentially erroneous approach to the matter, the High Court is not precluded from recording proper findings. [572-H]

1.1 The notices issued by the respondent to the appellant containing the averments that he was ready and willing to perform the contract which were not actually served on the appellant because of his refusal to accept them must be presumed to have been served as contemplated by Section 27 of the General Clauses Act..Therefore the High Court was right in relying upon the averments in the notices which could be treated as part to the plaint

The court should approve the award with the desire to support it

The court should approve the award with the desire to support it, if that is reasonably possible rather than to destroy it, by calling it illegal. This court has very limited jurisdiction to interfere with the reasoned award. Only when the award is based upon a proposition of law which is unjustified in law, the error of law must appear from the award itself or from any document or note incorporated in it or appended to it. It is not permissible to travel beyond and consider material not incorporated in or
appended to the award.

Electricity Act, 2003 will prevail over Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

We make it clear that it is only with regard to the authority which can adjudicate or arbitrate disputes that the Electricity Act, 2003 will prevail over Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. However, as regards, the procedure to be followed by the State Commission (or the arbitrator nominated by it) and other matters related to arbitration (other than appointment of the arbitrator) the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 will apply (except if there is a conflicting provision in the Act of 2003). In other words, Section 86(1)(f) is only restricted to the authority which is to adjudicate or arbitrate between licensees and generating companies. Procedural and other matters relating to such proceedings will of course be governed by Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, unless there is a conflicting provision in the Act of 2003.

Result of participation in a proceedings without showing protest or objection

State Bank of India vs. Ram Das : (2003) 12 SCC 474

It is an established view of law that where a party despite knowledge of the defect in the jurisdiction or bias or malice of an arbitrator participated in the proceedings without any kind of objection, by his conduct it disentitles itself from raising such a question in the subsequent proceedings. What we find is that the appellant despite numerous opportunities made available to it, although it was aware of the defect in the award of the umpire, at no stage made out any case of bias against the umpire. We, therefore, find that the appellant cannot be permitted to raise the question of bias for the first time before this Court.

Union of India vs. S. Vinodh Kumar : (2007) 8 SCC100 has held :-

It is also well settled that those candidates who had taken part in the selection process knowing fully well procedure laid down therein were not entitled to the same.

automatic suspension of the execution of the award

But then we noticed from the mandatory language of section 34 of the 1996 Act, that an award, when challenged under section 34 within the time stipulated therein, becomes unexecutable. There is no discretion left with the court to pass any interlocutory order in regard to the said award except to adjudicate on the correctness of the claim made by the applicant therein. Therefore, that being the legislative intent, any direction from us contrary to that, also becomes impermissible. On facts of this case, there being no exceptional situation which would compel us to ignore such statutory provision, and to use our jurisdiction under Article 142, we restrain ourselves from passing any such order, as prayed for by the applicant.
However, we do notice that this automatic suspension of the execution of the award, the moment an application challenging the said award is filed under section 34 of the Act leaving no discretion in the court to put the parties on terms, in our opinion, defeats the very objective of the alternate dispute resolution system to which arbitration belongs. We do find that there is a recommendation made by the concerned Ministry to the Parliament to amend section 34 with a proposal to empower the civil court to pass suitable interim orders in such cases. In view of the urgency of such amendment, we sincerely hope that necessary steps would be taken by the authorities concerned at the earliest to bring about the required change in law

Limitation act applicable to A & C Act 1996

AC Act is no doubt, a special law, consolidating and amending the law relating to arbitration and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. AC Act does not prescribe the period of limitation, for various proceedings under that Act, except where it intends to prescribe a period different from what is prescribed in the Limitation Act. On the other hand, Section 43 makes the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to Proceedings - both in court and in arbitration - under the AC Act. There is also no express exclusion of application of any provision of the Limitation Act to proceedings under AC Act, but there are some specific departures from the general provisions of Limitation Act, as for example, the proviso to section 34(3) and sub-sections (2) to (4) of section 43 of the AC Act. Where the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes a period of limitation for appeals or applications to any court, and the special or local law provides for filing of appeals and applications to the court, but does not prescribe any period of limitation in regard to such appeals or applications, the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act will apply to such appeals or applications and consequently the provisions of sections 4 to 24 will also apply. Where the special or local law prescribes for any appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act, then the provisions of section 29(2) will be attracted. In that event, the provisions of section 3 of Limitation Act will apply, as if the period of limitation prescribed under the special law was the period prescribed by the Schedule to Limitation Act, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for the appeal or application by the special law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 will apply to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special law. The object of section 29(2) is to ensure that the principles contained in sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act apply to suits, appeals and applications filed in a court under special or local laws also, even if it prescribes a period of limitation different from what is prescribed in the Limitation Act, except to the extent of express exclusion of the application of any or all of those provisions.

judgment on Section 141of N. I. Act

In S.M.S Pharmaceuticals [(2005)8
SCC 89], a three Judge Bench of this Court examined
the scope and ambit of Section 141 of the Act and the 6
liability created with respect to the Directors and other
persons responsible for the affairs of the company.
Three questions were posed:
"(a) Whether for purposes of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, it is sufficient if the substance of the allegation read as a whole fulfill the requirements of the said section and it is not necessary to specifically state in the complaint that the person accused was in charge of, or responsible for, the conduct of the business of the company.

(b) Whether a director of a company would be deemed to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for conduct of the business of the company and, therefore, deemed to be guilty of the offence unless he proves to the contrary.
(c) Even if it is held that specific averments are necessary, whether in the absence of such averments the signatory of the cheque and or the managing directors or joint managing director who admittedly would be in charge of the company and responsible to the company for conduct of its business could be proceeded against."

The above questions were answered in the following terms: 7
(a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141 that at the time offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averments is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied.
(b) The answer to the question posed in sub-para (b) has to be in the negative. Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under section 141 of the Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The requirement of Section 141 is that the person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a director in such cases.
(c) The answer to Question ( C ) has to be in the affirmative. The question notes that the managing director or joint managing director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the Act. By virtue of the office they hold as managing director or joint managing director, these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Therefore, 8
they get covered under Section 141. So far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141."

International arbitration

Whenever in an interpretation clause, the word "means" is used the same must be given a restrictive meaning

disputes relating to specific performance of a contract can be referred to arbitration

Ms.Ruma Pal,J. observed: .....merely because the sections of the SpecificRelief Act confer discretion on courts to grant specificperformance of a contract does nto means that parties cannotagree that the discretion will be exercised by a forum oftheir choice. If the converse were true, then whenever arelief is dependent upon the exercise of discretion of acourt by statute e.g. the grant of interest or costs,parties chould be precluded from referring the dispute toarbitration.
We agree with this reasoning. We hold on Point 3 that disputes relating to specific performance of a contract can be referred to arbitration and Section 34(2)(b)(i) is not attracted

restrictive/negative covenants

The result of the above discussion is that considerations against restrictive covenants are different in cases where the restriction is to apply during the period after the termination of the contract than those in cases where it is to operate during the period of the contract. Negative covenants operative during the period of the contract of employment when the employee is bound to serve his employer exclusively are generally not regarded as restraint of trade and therefore do not fall under section 27 of the Contract Act. A negative covenant that the employee would not engage himself in a trade or business or would not get himself employed by any other master for whom he would perform similar or substantially similar duties is not therefore a restraint of trade unless the contract as aforesaid is unconscionable or excessively harsh or unreasonable or one sided as in the case of W.H. Milsted and Son Ltd.(3).

JUDGMENT ON LIMITATION

Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction. On analysis of the said Section, it becomes evident that the following conditions must be satisfied before Section 14 can be pressed into service:
(1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party;
(2) The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith;
(3) The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature;
(4) The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue and;(5) Both the proceedings are in a court.

To attract the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, five conditions enumerated in the earlier part of this Judgment have to co-exist. There is no manner of doubt that the section deserves to be construed liberally. Due diligence and caution are essentially pre-requisites for attracting Section 14. Due diligence cannot be measured by any absolute standards. Due diligence is a measure of prudence or activity expected from and ordinarily exercised by a reasonable and prudent person under the particular circumstances.
The definition of good faith as found in Section 2(h) of the Limitation Act would indicate that nothing shall be deemed to be in good faith which is not done with due care and attention

interpretation of Section 85 of the A & C Act 1996.

we are of the view that in the absence of existence of any arbitration tribunal, it is only the High Court to exercise its power under Section 11 of the Act to appoint an arbitrator to go into the disputes and differences between the parties.

consumer protection act is applicable on Regional Provident Fund

In fact, the same proposition has been explained in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner vs. Shiv Kumar Joshi [2000 (1) SCC 98], wherein in relation to the operation of the Consumer Protection Act to the Employees' Provident Fund Schemes it was held as follows:
"A perusal of the Scheme clearly and unambiguously indicates that it is a 'service' within the meaning of Section 2(1)(o) and the member a 'consumer' within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. It is, therefore, without any substance to urge that the services under the Scheme are rendered free of charge and, therefore, the Scheme is not a 'service' under the Act. Both the State as well as the National Commission have dealt with this aspect in detail and rightly come to the conclusion that the Act was applicable in the case of the Scheme on the ground that its member was a 'consumer' under Section 2(1)(d) and the Scheme was a 'service' under Section 2(1)(o)."

judgment on biasness

this judgment is on biasness

reference of dispute to Lok Adalat

It is evident from the said provisions that Lok Adalats have no
adjudicatory or judicial functions. Their functions relate purely to
conciliation. A Lok Adalat determines a reference on the basis of a
compromise or settlement between the parties at its instance, and put its seal
of confirmation by making an award in terms of the compromise or
settlement. When the Lok Adalat is not able to arrive at a settlement or
compromise, no award is made and the case record is returned to the court
from which the reference was received, for disposal in accordance with law.
No Lok Adalat has the power to "hear" parties to adjudicate cases as a court
does. It discusses the subject matter with the parties and persuades them to
arrive at a just settlement. In their conciliatory role, the Lok Adalats are
guided by principles of justice, equity, fair play. When the LSA Act refers to
'determination' by the Lok Adalat and 'award' by the Lok Adalat, the said
Act does not contemplate nor require an adjudicatory judicial determination,
but a non-adjudicatory determination based on a compromise or settlement,
arrived at by the parties, with guidance and assistance from the Lok Adalat.
The 'award' of the Lok Adalat does not mean any independent verdict or
opinion arrived at by any decision making process. The making of the award
is merely an administrative act of incorporating the terms of settlement or
compromise agreed by parties in the presence of the Lok Adalat, in the form
of an executable order under the signature and seal of the Lok Adalat.

But we find that many sitting or retired Judges, while participating in
Lok Adalats as members, tend to conduct Lok Adalats like courts, by
hearing parties, and imposing their views as to what is just and equitable, on
the parties. Sometimes they get carried away and proceed to pass orders on
merits, as in this case, even though there is no consensus or settlement. Such
acts, instead of fostering alternative dispute resolution through Lok Adalats,
will drive the litigants away from Lok Adalats. Lok Adalats should resist
their temptation to play the part of Judges and constantly strive to function
as conciliators. The endeavour and effort of the Lok Adalats should be to
guide and persuade the parties, with reference to principles of justice, equity
and fair play to compromise and settle the dispute by explaining the pros and
cons, strength and weaknesses, advantages and disadvantages of their
respective claims.

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Judgments and Awards

You can find here case laws ( Supreme Court and High Courts) on Aribtration and Conciliation Act 1996 against each section.

Dictionary

Important judgment

In terms of the decision in Bhatia International (supra), we hold that Part I of the Act is applicable to the Award in question even though it is a foreign Award.

Meaning of Legal Maxims

Meaning of Legal Maxims

Judgemnt on sec 16 of A & C Act 1996

We, therefore, hold that the respondent must be deemed to have waived any objection to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal when it chose not to raise the plea now being raised by it, though it was fully aware of the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties. Section 34(iv) cannot come to the rescue of the respondent as the said section cannot be read in isolation and allowed to render otiose the provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 16 of the Act which, in a sense, are the high points of the Act. Any other interpretation of the aforesaid provisions of the statute would not only deprive the winning party of the fruit of its hard earned labour at the end of a long drawn out battle, but, in our considered opinion, would be opposed to public policy,as it would inevitably result in colossal waste of time, money and energy, all of which are necessarily expended in the arbitral process. This apart, it would frustrate the object of the Act itself viz., to provide for expeditious disposal of a dispute by recourse to arbitration.

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solution_legal: liability of the guarantor — in view of the statutory provision under section 130 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,

solution_legal: liability of the guarantor — in view of the statutory provision under section 130 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,

liability of the guarantor — in view of the statutory provision under section 130 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,

2008 SCCL.COM 365(Case No: Civil Appeal No.1878 of 2008) Sita Ram Gupta Appellant versus Punjab National Bank & others RespondentsDate of Decision(mm/dd/yy): 3/10/2008.Judge(s): Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarun Chatterjee and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Harjit Singh Bedi. Subject Index: Indian Contract Act, 1872 — section 130 — liability of the guarantor — in view of the statutory provision under section 130 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, whether the High Court was justified in holding that the appellant who was a guarantor of the loan advanced to the defendant nos.1 to 4 was liable to pay the decretal amount on the ground that the appellant had revoked the guarantee before such loan was actually paid to the defendant Nos.1 to 4 and long before the suit was filed by the bank against the defendants for recovery of such loan — not open to the appellant to revoke the guarantee as the appellant had agreed to treat the guarantee as a continuing one and was bound by the terms and conditions of the said guarantee — it is difficult to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant that in view of the statutory provision under Section 130 of the Act, after the revocation of the guarantee by the appellant, he was not liable to pay the decretal amount to the Bank.

link on section 27 of Indian Contract Act

find attached herewith the important link on judgments on section 27 of Indian Contract Act

restrictive covenant in restraint of trade in service agreement

Convenant in restraint of trade-Contract Act, 1872, Section 27, scope of-Whether a post-service restrictive covenant in restraint of trade in service agreement between the parties is void-Even if it be valid, whether it could be enforceable, as enjoined by illustrations (c) and (d) to Section 57 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Definition of Workman under ID Act

case law on the subject of how to determine whether an employee is a workman or not

The case law on the subject of how to determine whether an employee is a workman or not has been discussed in considerable detail in K.H. Pandhi vs. Presiding Officer, CW No.1224 of 1978 decided on 5th February 2004.

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in H.R. Adyanthaya vs. Sandoz (India) Ltd., (1994) 5 SCC 737

The question that arose in T.P. Srivastava vs. M/s National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd, AIR 1991 SC 2294 was whether a Section Salesman was a workman or not.

Enforcement of a part of the arbitral award

"Can a part of the arbitral award be enforced during the pendency of an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short the `Act') seeking the setting aside of the other part of the award", is the short but important question which we have been called upon to answer in the present appeal.

We are clearly of the opinion that that part of the award which is not under challenge has become final and is enforceable under Section 36 of the Act irrespective of the pendency of the application under Section 34 of the Act challenging and seeking the setting aside of the other part of the award

Termination of Service due to Absence

Dharmarathmakara Raibahadur Arcot Ramaswamy Mudaliar Educational Institution vs. Educational Appellate Tribunal & Anr., (1997) 7 SCC 332

"The contention of learned counsel for the respondent is confined that there was no enquiry in terms of Section 6 of the said Act. There is no submission of any defence on merit. Even before us when we granted learned counsel an opportunity to give any prima facie or plausible explanations on record to defend her actions, nothing could be placed before us. Giving of opportunity or an enquiry of course is a check and balance concept that no one's right be taken away without giving him/her opportunity or without enquiry in a given case or where the statute requires. But this cannot be in a case where allegation and charges are admitted and no possible defence is placed before the authority concerned. What enquiry is to be made when one admits violations? When she admitted she did not join M.Phil. course, she did not report back to her duty which is against her condition of leave and contrary to her affidavit which is the charge, what enquiry was to be made? In a case where the facts are almost admitted, the case reveals itself and is apparent on the face of the record, and in spite of opportunity no worth while explanation is forthcoming as in the present case, it would be not be a fit case to interfere with the termination order."

Leave encashment not included in wages for PF calculation

The term 'basic wage' which includes all emoluments
which are earned by an employee while on duty or on leave or
on holidays with wages in accordance with the terms of the
contract of employment can only mean weekly holidays,
national holidays and festival holidays etc. In many cases the
employees do not take leave and encash it at the time of
retirement or same is encashed after his death which can be
said to be uncertainties and contingencies. Though provisions
have been made for the employer for such contingencies
unless the contingency of encashing the leave is there, the
question of actual payment to the workman does not take
place. In view of the decision of this Court in Bridge Roof's
case (supra) and TI Cycles's case (supra) the inevitable
conclusion is that basic wage was never intended to include
amounts received for leave encashment.

Company law and arbitration law

In view of our conclusion, we are satisfied that the appellant has wrongly based its arguments on matters such as ouster of jurisdiction, over-riding effect of special statute over general statute, over-riding effect of subsequent statute etc. Since they have no application whatsoever to the matter in issue, there is no need to refer various decisions in those aspects. Ouster of jurisdiction arises only in regard to original jurisdiction and it cannot have any application to appellate jurisdiction as the one provided in Section 50 of the Arbitration Act. The appeal is a statutory remedy and it can lie only to the specified forum. The appellate forum cannot be decided on the basis of cause of action as applicable to original proceedings such as suit which could be filed in any court where part of cause of action arises. In such circumstances, we are unable to accept the lengthy arguments advanced on the above-mentioned subject by learned senior counsel for the appellant. Likewise, the submission of the appellant, namely, the Arbitration Act being a special and subsequent statute has no relevance to the present case.

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consumer forum arbitration

Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. N.K. Modi [(1996) 6 SCC 385], it was held that the District Forum, National Commission and the State ...


Considered from this perpective, we hold that this
dispute need not be referred to arbitration under clause
[12] of the agreement and the matter could be decided on
merits by the State Commission ( consumer ) itself.

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judicial authority meaning

We are, however, not oblivious of a decision of this Court in The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi [1950 SCR 459] wherein an Industrial Tribunal functioning under the Industrial Disputes Act was held to be not a Judicial Tribunal, stating that although it has all the trappings of a court but is not a court.
The expression 'judicial authority' must, therefore, be interpreted having regard to the purport and object for which the 1996 Act was enacted. Judging the contention of the Board and having regard to the width of its jurisdiction, we are of the opinion that the Board is a judicial authority within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act.

judgment of Supreme Court regarding Court

judgment

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE 1996 ACT AND THE 1940 ACT

Important judgment

Meaning of important terms:

Such as re-arbitration is possible or not etc.

MACT JUDGMENT

An interesting question has been raised in this appeal about the acceptability of claim for grant of compensation when the relatives are legal heirs but are not dependants of the deceased,

http://indian-arbitrationlaw.blogspot.com/

http://indian-arbitrationlaw.blogspot.com/

Site address some IMPORTANT & RELEVANT JUDGMENTS

IMPORTANT & RELEVANT JUDGMENTS OF
HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

procedure for appointment of substitute arbitrator

When Section 15(2) says that a substitute arbitrator can
be appointed according to the rules that were applicable
for the appointment of the arbitrator originally, it is not
confined to an appointment under any statutory rule or
rule framed under the Act or under the Scheme. It only
means that the appointment of the substitute arbitrator
must be done according to the original agreement or
provision applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator
at the initial stage. We are not in a position to agree with
the contrary view taken by some of the High Courts.

Section 11 of A & C Act 1996

The legislative scheme of Section 11 is very clear. If the parties have agreed on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators as contemplated by sub-section (2) thereof, then the dispute between the parties has to be decided in accordance with the said procedure and recourse to the Chief Justice or his designate cannot be taken straightaway. A party can approach the Chief Justice or his designate only if the parties have not agreed on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator as contemplated by sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act or the various contingencies provided for in sub-section (6) have arisen. Since the parties here had agreed on a procedure for appointing an arbitrator for settling the dispute by arbitration as contemplated by sub-section (2) and there is no allegation that anyone of the contingencies enumerated in clauses (a) or (b) or (c) of sub-section (6) had arisen, the application moved by the respondent herein to the City Civil Court, Hyderabad, was clearly not maintainable and the said court had no jurisdiction to entertain such an application and pass any order. The order dated 27.12.2004, therefore, is not sustainable.

In the matter of settlement of dispute by arbitration, the agreement executed by the parties has to be given great importance and an agreed procedure for appointing the arbitrators has been placed on high pedestal and has to be given preference to any other mode for securing appointment of an arbitrator.

limitation to file applicationu/s 34

when the award dated 12.10.2003 was passed the only option with the appellant was either to have moved an application under Section 34 within three months as required under sub-section (3) of Section 34 or within the extended period of another 30 days. But in stead of that a totally misconceived application was filed and there too the prayer was for review and with regard to mode of payment. The question of review was totally misconceived as there is no such provision in the Act for review of the award by the arbitrator and the clarification sought for as to the mode of payment is not contemplated under Section 33 of the Act. Therefore, in this background, the application was totally misconceived and the reply sent by the arbitrator does not entitle the appellant a fresh cause of action so as to file an application under Section 34(3) of the Act, taking it as the starting point of limitation from the date of reply given by the arbitrator i.e. 10.4.2004.

jurisdiction a & c act 1996

It would not be open to that party to take up the position that by refusing to go into the merits of his claim, the Arbitral Tribunal had upheld a plea that it does not have jurisdiction to entertain the claim and hence the award or order made by it, comes within the purview of Section 16(2) of the Act and consequently is appealable under Section 37(2)(a) of the Act.

A & C Act 1996 section 16

We do not find any merit in the above arguments. The plea of "no arbitration clause" was not raised in the written statement filed by Jala Nigam before the Arbitrator. The said plea was not advanced before the civil court in Arbitration Case No.1 of 2001. On the contrary, both the courts below on facts have found that Jala Nigam had consented to the arbitration of the disputes by the Chief Engineer. Jala Nigam had participated in the arbitration proceedings. It submitted itself to the authority of the Arbitrator. It gave consent to the appointment of the Chief Engineer as an Arbitrator. It filed its written statements to the additional claims made by the contractor. The executive engineer who appeared on behalf of Jala Nigam did not invoke Section 16 of the Arbitration Act. He did not challenge the competence of the arbitral tribunal. He did not call upon the arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction. On the contrary, it submitted to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. It also filed written arguments. It did not challenge the order of the High Court dated 10.9.99 passed in C.M.P. No.26/99. Suffice it to say that both the parties accepted that there was an arbitration agreement, they proceeded on that basis and, therefore, Jala Nigam cannot be now allowed to contend that Clause 29 of the Contract did not constitute an arbitration agreement.

requirement of reasoning in an award

"It is now well settled that an award can neither be remitted nor set aside merely on the ground that it does not contain reasons in support of the conclusion or decisions reached in it except where the arbitration agreement or the deed of submission requires him to give reasons. The arbitrator or umpire is under no obligation to give reasons in support of the decision reached by him unless under the arbitration agreement or in the deed of submission he is required to give such reasons and if the arbitrator or umpire chooses to give reasons in support of his decision it is open to the court to set aside the award if it finds that an error of law has been committed by the arbitrator or umpire on the face of the record on going through such reasons. The arbitrator or umpire shall have to give reasons also where the court has directed in any order such as the one made under Section 20 or Section 21 or Section 34 of the Act that reasons should be given or where the statute which governs an arbitration requires him to do so."

Section 8 of the A & C Act 1996

Section 8 of the 1996 Act is peremptory in nature. In a case where there exists an arbitration agreement, the court is under obligation to refer the parties to arbitration in terms of the arbitration agreement. [See Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums, (2003) 6 SCC 503 and Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited (supra)] No issue, therefore, would remain to be decided in a suit. Existence of arbitration agreement is not disputed. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, was right in referring the dispute between the parties to arbitration.

named arbitrator

The apprehension that named arbitrator may not act fairly is without any foundation. This Court in International Authority of India v. K. D. Bali (1988 (2) SCC 360) held that there must be reasonable evidence to satisfy that there was a real likelihood of bias. Vague suspicions of whimsical, capricious and unreasonable people should not be made the standard to regulate normal human conduct. In this country in numerous contracts with the government, clauses requiring the Superintending Engineer or some official of the Government to be the arbitrator are there. It cannot be said that the Superintending Engineer, as such cannot be entrusted with the work of arbitration and that an apprehension, simpliciter in the mind of the contractor without any tangible ground, would be a justification for removal. No other ground for the alleged apprehension was indicated in the pleadings before the learned Judge or the decision of the learned Judge. There was, in our opinion, no ground for removal of the arbitrator. Mere imagination of a ground cannot be an excuse for apprehending bias in the mind of the chosen arbitrator."

Non-speaking award

The decided cases of this Court demonstrate that this Court has consistently taken the view that scope of interference in a non-speaking award is extremely limited. The Court cannot probe into the mental process of the arbitrator. The court should endeavour to support a non-speaking arbitration award provided it adhered to the parties agreement and was not invalidated due to arbitrators misconduct.

judgment

vThe award is challenged by the petitioner on the following grounds:-
A. That the writing dated 21st June, 2003 does not constitute an arbitration agreement.
(i) that the said writing only contemplates avoidance of any future dispute and does not refer to any existing dispute nor it refers to arbitration.
(ii) that in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (1998) 3 SCC 573 and (2004) 1 SCC 372 @ 17 an agreement for avoidance of a dispute is not an arbitration agreement.......................................................................................

judgment Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

The object of the Act is to ensure that where parties can agree to resolve their differences through recourse of arbitral proceedings, every endeavour should be made to make them to traverse this avenue rather than knock at the doors of the Courts. In all such cases it is difficult to appreciate why the Plaintiff has filed a Suit when it was aware of the existence of an Arbitration Clause. In the event of the Plaintiff's ignorance of this position, no prejudice would be caused to it if the parties are referred to arbitration no sooner the position is learnt of.

judgment arbitraton

I have considered the aforesaid preliminary objection in the light of the documents placed on record. The petitioner did not challenge the appointment of the arbitrator at the very initial stage and instead submitted to his jurisdiction by filing its claims and counter-claims, and therefore, in the light of the said facts I hold that the principles of waiver and acquiescence are applicable to the facts of the present case and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to raise the aforesaid plea.

judgment A & C Act 1996

In this application under Section 12,13,14 and 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (hereinafter be referred to as `Act' only) the petitioner prays for termination of the mandate of the sole arbitrator-respondent No.4 and appointment of another Arbitrator in his place, preferably a retired Judge.

The Courts should be always slow in terminating the mandate of an appointed Arbitrator as it results in delay of the arbitral proceedings. It is true that an Arbitrator should scrupulously avoid giving any impression that he is not independent or impartial and must disclose to the parties the circumstance, if any, referred to in Clause (1) of Section 12 of the Act but the Courts while considering such a petition should objectively examine as to whether there is any real danger of bias and the complainants apprehensions are well founded.

judgemnt u/s 16 of A & C Act 1996

The petitioner by this writ petition seeks quashing of order dated 1st March,2003 by Mr.Justice P.K.Bahri (Retd.) and a declaration that the Arbitration Clause in the contract is void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. The petitioner as a consequence seeks stay of the proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal

The petitioner, as noted earlier, challenged the maintainability of the proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal of Justice P.K.Bahri (Retd.) and questioned his jurisdiction under Section 16 of the Act on the ground that the arbitration clause in the contract between the parties is void and un-forceable at law. It was urged that appointment of a Sole Arbitrator only by one party to the dispute violates the equitable principle that no man can be a judge in his own cause.

judgment on section 14 of A & C Act 1996

A short but important question - 'whether the mandate of an arbitrator terminates on the expiry of the stipulated period for making the award within the meaning of Section 14 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996? has arisen for determination in this case.

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judgment of supreme court of india

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Arbitration- its meaning and scope

Arbitration is a method of dispute resolution which involves the judicial determination of the dispute outside the court by one or more independent third patry(ies) called "arbitration" whose called "arbitral award" is final and binding upon the parties.
As per indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 section 2 (1) (a) "arbitration" means any arbitration whether or not administered by permanent arbitral institution.
The scope of arbitration is hidden in section 7 (1). That defines the arbitration agreement. Section 7 (1) says "in this Part, "arbitration agreement" means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. " Thus it is clear that only dispute can be the subject matter of the arbitration proceeding. Parties may give their consent regarding arbitration proceeding before the dispute has been arisen.

Requirement of arbitration agreement:
Sec.7(2) An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement.
(3) An arbitration agreement shall be in writing.
(4) An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in—
(a) a document signed by the parties;
(b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommuni­cation which provide a record of the agreement; or
(c) an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other.
(5) The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause part of the contract