Tuesday, November 21, 2017

NCDRC_prayer for refund_pecuniary jurisdiction_the value of complaint_the value of the amount deposited plus compensation claimed

NCDRC_prayer for refund_pecuniary jurisdiction_the value of complaint_the value of the amount deposited plus compensation claimed

".............It is found that the judgment of Ambrish Kumar Shukla (supra) is silent on the issue of value of goods and services in cases where refund has been requested.  Obviously, there is difference in the cases where parties want to go ahead and conclude the sale of goods or availment of services and where one party is only seeking the refund and thereby clearly deciding for non-execution of the agreement.  In the cases of refund the value of complaint has to be the value of the amount deposited plus compensation claimed. In the present case, amount deposited is Rs.33,56,942/- and compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- has been demanded.  Thus, the total figure does not cross the limit of Rupees One Crore, which is necessary for this Commission to exercise its jurisdiction. Even the addition of demanded interest shall not make the total value more than Rs. One Crore. In these circumstances, this Commission does not have pecuniary jurisdiction to decide the instant complaint case. "


NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
 
CONSUMER CASE NO. 1464 OF 2017
 
 RUHI SETH
Versus
 
IREO GRACE REALTECH PVT. LTD.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
 
CONSUMER CASE NO. 1464 OF 2017
 
1. RUHI SETH
W/o. Sh. Nitin Seth, R/o. L - 11, 2nd Floor, South Extention - II,
New Delhi - 110049
...........Complainant(s)
Versus 
1. IREO GRACE REALTECH PVT. LTD.
Through its MD, Mr. Anurag Bhargava, Having its Office at: 304, Kanchan House, Karampura Commercial Complex,
New Delhi - 110015
...........Opp.Party(s)

BEFORE: 
 HON'BLE MR. PREM NARAIN,PRESIDING MEMBER

For the Complainant :
Ms. Manju Datt, Advocate and
Ms. Nimmi Sharma, Advocate
For the Opp.Party :

Dated : 13 Nov 2017
ORDER
1.      This complaint has been filed by the complainant, Ruhi Seth, against the opposite party.
2.      The brief facts of the complaint are that the complainant booked an apartment with the opposite party for a total consideration of Rs.1,84,44,568/-.  The complainant had paid Rs,33,56,942/- to the opposite party. When the draft builder-buyer agreement was dispatched to the complainant, she objected to certain clauses under the said agreement and the same was sent back to the opposite party.  The opposite party again sent revised builder-buyer agreement.  However, the same was also not agreed by the complainant. Then the complainant refused to release further instalments to the opposite party.  Consequently the opposite party unilaterally cancelled the unit provisionally assigned to the complainant and forfeited the total amount deposited by the complainant.
3.      Aggrieved by the act of the opposite party, the complainant filed a consumer complaint before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Delhi, bearing No.664 of 2017.  However, the complaint was returned by the State Commission vide its order dated 05.05.2017  with the direction to the complainant to file the complaint before the appropriate Forum as the consideration of the flat was more than rupees one Crore.  Accordingly, the present complaint has been filed by the complainant.
4.      Heard the learned counsel for the complainant at the admission stage of the complaint.  The learned counsel pointed out that the complaint was earlier filed with the State Commission as the refund amount was earlier Rs.33,56,942/-.  The State Commission vide its order dated 05.05.2017 has ordered that the complaint has to be filed before the appropriate Commission. Hence, the present complaint has been filed. The learned counsel further mentioned that as per the judgement of larger Bench of this Commission in the matter of Consumer Case No.97 of 2016, Ambrish Kumar Shukla & Ors. Vs. Ferrous Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., decided on 07.10.2016 (NC), it has been observed that the pecuniary jurisdiction shall be considered on the basis of total consideration amount and in this case the total consideration amount is Rs.1,84,44,568/- and therefore, this Commission has the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon this complaint.
5.      I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the complainant and have examined the record. The following prayer has been made in the complaint:-
“a. To admit the present consumer complaint and issue notice to the opposite party.
b. The opposite party be directed to refund to the complainant a sum of Rs.67,81,023/- including the deposited amount of Rs.33,56,942/- and Rs.34,24,081/- (approximately) towards interest calculated @ 24% per annum from 20.03.2013 till 20.05.2017.
c. The opposite party be also directed to pay future interest and pendent elite interest @ 24% per annum on the aforementioned amount from the date of filing of the present complaint till its realization.
d. To hold the opposite party liable for deficiency in service.
e. To hold the opposite party liable for unfair trade practice.
f. The opposite party be also directed to pay a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- to the complainant towards harassment, mental agony, deficiency in service, unfair trade practice and also the loss of finances suffered by the complainant.
g. That the opposite party be also directed to pay a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- to the complainant for meeting the legal expenses in pursuing this complaint before this Hon’ble Commission.
h. Any further relief or order, which this Hon’ble Commission may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present complaint, may also be passed in favour of the complainant in the interest of justice.”
6.      From the above prayer, it is clear that the main request is for refund of deposited amount of Rs.33,56,942/- along with interest @ 24% p.a., which comes toRs.34,24,081/-. Apart from this, the complainant has also requested for a compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- and cost of litigation as Rs.1,00,000/-.  The Section 21(a)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 reads as under:-
21.  Jurisdiction of the National Commission- Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission shall have jurisdiction-
(a) to entertain-
     (i) complainants where the value of the goods or services and compensation, if any, claimed exceed [rupees one crore]”
7.      The issue of pecuniary jurisdiction has been recently decided by the larger Bench of this Commission in Consumer Case No.97 of 2016, Ambrish Kumar Shukla & Ors. Vs. Ferrous Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., decided on 07.10.2016 (NC).  A reading of this judgment shows that this Commission has held that in cases where even the part deficiency is to be removed, the full value of the subject matter whether goods or services will be taken as the value of goods and services for deciding the pecuniary jurisdiction. However this assertion of the larger bench of this Commission is based on the value of goods or services as mentioned in context of the definition of “ consumer” as given in Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 which includes the phrase “partly paid and partly promised”. It is found that the judgment of Ambrish Kumar Shukla (supra) is silent on the issue of value of goods and services in cases where refund has been requested.  Obviously, there is difference in the cases where parties want to go ahead and conclude the sale of goods or availment of services and where one party is only seeking the refund and thereby clearly deciding for non-execution of the agreement.  In the cases of refund the value of complaint has to be the value of the amount deposited plus compensation claimed. In the present case, amount deposited is Rs.33,56,942/- and compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- has been demanded.  Thus, the total figure does not cross the limit of Rupees One Crore, which is necessary for this Commission to exercise its jurisdiction. Even the addition of demanded interest shall not make the total value more than Rs. One Crore. In these circumstances, this Commission does not have pecuniary jurisdiction to decide the instant complaint case.
8.      The complainant had rightly filed the complaint before the State Commission.  However, the State Commission without going into the details has returned the complaint to be filed before the appropriate forum.  From the aforesaid analysis of the subject, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the State Commission as total amount demanded in the prayer is less than Rupees one crore. The interest to be earned in future cannot be allowed as part of compensation to decide the pecuniary jurisdiction.
9.      Based on the above discussion, I find that the present complaint is not maintainable before this Commission for want of pecuniary jurisdiction. Hence, consumer complaint No.1464 of 2017 stands dismissed as not being maintainable before this Commission due to lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. However, in the interest of justice, order dated 05.05.2017 of the State Commission shall not come in the way. The complainant shall be at liberty either to file fresh complaint or to move an application for revival of the complaint No.664 of 2017 before the State Commission.  If such an application is moved within 8 weeks from the date of this order, the State Commission shall revive and restore the complaint No.664 of 2017 at its original number and shall proceed to decide the complaint.            
 
......................
PREM NARAIN
PRESIDING MEMBER

Saturday, November 4, 2017

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE_ Binding precedent



Binding precedent – Earlier Decision of a co-equal bench, held is binding on another co-equal bench and has to be respected by it. Judicial discipline and decorum is paramount. Where the latter bench feels that the earlier judgement is so incorrect that it cannot be followed, it should refer the matter to a larger bench.  Cases of Kalika Kuer [JT 2003 (4) SC 489], G.L. Batra, Jaisri Sahu alongwith other cases referred. (Paras 16-24)

National Insurance Company Limited
v.
Pranay Sethi and Ors.
 
Dipak Misra, CJI., A.K. Sikri, A.M. Khanwilkar, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Ashok Bhushan JJ.
Judgement Date 31-10-2017

Thursday, June 29, 2017

NCDRC_ failure to deliver possession gives rise to recurrent cause of action


NCDRC_ failure to deliver possession gives rise to recurrent cause of action


4.      The learned counsel for the opposite party states that the complaint is barred by limitation having filed in August, 2015.  However, there is no merit in the contention since the failure to deliver possession of the bungalow gave rise to recurrent cause of action to the complainant as was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Meerut Development Authority Vs. M.K. Gupta, in SLP (C) CC No.8481 of 2012, decided on 09.5.2012.







NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
 
CONSUMER CASE NO. 683 OF 2015
 
1. SADHANA & 2 ORS.
"MARK HAVEN" GROUND FLOOR, 12, APOLLO BUNDER,
MUMBAI-400039, MAHARASHTRA
...........Complainant(s)
Versus 
1. SAHARA PRIME CITY LIMITED & 9 ORS.
(REP. BY AUTHRIZED SIGNATORY SHRI ANUJ KUMAR DWIVEDI) SAHARA INDIA CENTRE, 2, KAPOORTHALA COMPLEX,
LUCKNOW-226024
2. KETUBH CITY HOMES MAU PRIVATE LIMITED
(REP. BY ITS AUTHRIZED PERSON SHREE PANKAJ) SAHARA INDIA BHAWAN, 1, KAPOORTHALA COMPLEX,
LUCKNOW-226024
...........Opp.Party(s)


Dated : 02 Jun 2017

NCDRC_common builder- buyer agreements_unconscionable contracts

NCDRC_common builder- buyer  agreements_unconscionable contracts



It is common parlance that, in the builder- buyer  agreements  the terms are framed as favorable and suitable  to the builders/ service providers.   In our view, these are unconscionable contracts. The builder exercise his  right to charge penalty or interest at 18-24% on the delayed payment of installments. Thus,  in our view, in the interest of natural justice the consumers at large deserve to receive same interest  from  opposite parties in cases of fault or deficiency.


NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
 

FIRST APPEAL NO. 374 OF 2015
 
(Against the Order dated 26/03/2015 in Complaint No. 25/2007 of the State Commission Uttar Pradesh)
1. SHEO PRAKASH GUPTA & ANR.
S/O. LATE NANNHE LAL GUPTA, DIRECTOR OF M/S. SANSKRITI REAL, ESTATE PRIVATE LIMITED, R/O. 117/H-2/110, PANDU NAGAR
KANPUR
UTTAR PRADESH
2. SHRI SANJAY GUPTA
S/O. RADHEY SHYAM GUPTA, DIRECTOR OF M/S. SANSKRITI REAL, ESTATE PRIVATE LIMITED, R/O. 117/H-2/110, PANDU NAGAR,
KANPUR
UTTAR PRADESH
...........Appellant(s)
Versus 
1. KANPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN, MOTIJHEEL,
KANPUR,
UTTAR PRADESH

Dated : 12 Jun 2017
...........Respondent(s)

Friday, April 21, 2017

NCDRC : no relationship of the consumer and service provider, iI the application for allotment was not considered,






5.       We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The State Commission in para-5 of the impugned order has observed that the only argument raised by the learned counsel for the HUDA is that since the application submitted by the respondent/complainant was beyond the date fixed for submitting the application, the application was not considered for allotment and the accompanying bank draft was not encashed. Despite of noting this fact the State Commission has failed to appreciate that if the application for allotment sent by the complainant was not considered, no relationship of the consumer and service provider came into being as such the Consumer Fora had no jurisdiction to intervene in the matter. Therefore, under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the impugned orders of the Fora below are without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside.


NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
 
REVISION PETITION NO. 3166 OF 2016
 
(Against the Order dated 18/12/2015 in Appeal No. 725/2015 of the State Commission Haryana)
HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Versus 
JASWANT SINGH


Dated : 17 Apr 2017
 

Wednesday, April 19, 2017

NCDRC ; Defective goods / services _Determination of pecuniary jurisdiction





7.       In the order dated 07.10.2016, passed by the three-member bench of this Commission in “Ambrish Kumar Shukla & Ors. vs. Ferrous Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.” (supra), it is mentioned, that the following issue was, interalia, referred in FA No. 166/2016 and allied matters by a single-member bench of this Commission to the larger bench:-


“(i)     In a situation, where the possession of a housing unit has already been delivered to the complainants and may be, sale deeds etc. also executed, but some deficiencies are pointed out in the construction/ development of the property, whether the pecuniary jurisdiction is to be determined, taking the value of such property as a whole, OR the extent of deficiency alleged is to be considered for the purpose of determining such pecuniary jurisdiction.”

8.       The three-member bench of this Commission observed as follows on the above issue:-

“It is evident from a bare perusal of Sections 21, 17 and 11 of the Consumer Protection Act that it’s the value of the goods or services and the compensation, if any, claimed which determines the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum.  The Act does not envisage determination of the pecuniary jurisdiction based upon the cost of removing the deficiencies in the goods purchased or the services to be rendered to the consumer.  Therefore, the cost of removing the defects or deficiencies in the goods or the services would have no bearing on the determination of the pecuniary jurisdiction.  If the aggregate of the value of the goods purchased or the services hired or availed of by a consumer, when added to the compensation, if any, claimed in the complaint by him, exceeds Rs. 1.00 crore, it is this Commission alone which would have the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.  For instance if a person purchases a machine for more than Rs.1.00 crore, a manufacturing defect is found in the machine and the cost of removing the said defect is Rs.10.00 lacs, it is the aggregate of the sale consideration paid by the consumer for the machine and compensation, if any, claimed in the complaint which would determine the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum.  Similarly, if  for instance, a house is sold for more than Rs.1.00 crore, certain defects are found in the house, and the cost of removing those defects is Rs.5.00 lacs, the complaint would have to be filed before this Commission, the value of the services itself being more than Rs.1.00 crore.”

9.       In the operative portion of the order it was stated as follows:-

“It is the value of the goods or services, as the case may be, and not the value or cost of removing the deficiency in the service which is to be considered for the purpose of determining the pecuniary jurisdiction.”


10.     It is manifestly clear from the order passed by this Commission in “Ambrish Kumar Shukla & Ors. vs. Ferrous Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.” (supra), that the value of the flat was to be taken into consideration for determining the pecuniary jurisdiction in the matter in hand.


NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
 
FIRST APPEAL NO. 472 OF 2016
 
(Against the Order dated 03/03/2016 in Complaint No. 45/2016 of the State Commission Haryana)

SANJAY SAINI
Versus
 
M/S. SPAZE TOWER PVT. LTD.

Wednesday, April 12, 2017

NCDRC _consumer has to establish commercial space booked for earning livelihood



1. NCDRC in CC/123/2015  titled as RAVI KUMAR v/s  M/S. S.S. CONBUILD PVT. LTD on  Dated : 10 Apr 2017 said as under:

  3.Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, to the extent it is relevant, provides that the term ‘consumer’ does not include a person who buys goods or hires or avails services for a commercial purpose, the only exception being the purchase of goods or hiring services by a person exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment.  Therefore, since the premises in question admittedly, is a commercial premises, it being a shop on the first floor of a shopping centre, the complainant cannot be said to be a consumer UNLESS HE IS ABLE TO ESTABLISH that he had agreed to purchase the said premises for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment therein.



2. NCDRC in CC/246/2013 titled as Mrs. PRITI ARORA, v/s M/s ARN INFRASTRUCTURE INDIA PVT. LTD, on Dated: 06 Apr 2017 said as under:

8.   Admittedly, the complainant had entered into multiple MOUs for booking commercial spaces in the commercial project.  Therefore, it cannot be disputed that complainant has hired / availed of services of the opposite party for commercial purpose.  Therefore, unless it is established that case of the complainant falls within the ambit of the Explanation to Section 2 (1) (d) of the Act in view of Exception carved out in the definition of consumer, complainant is excluded from the definition of consumer.


Monday, April 10, 2017

Mere submission of an application for allotment, which does not result either in allotment or registration and consequent inclusion in the awaiting list for such an allotment, does not confer upon him the status of a consumer



As far as a person who applies for allotment of a plot/flat is concerned, he will not be a consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1) (d) of the Act, if neither any allotment is made to him nor he is registered for and awaiting such an allotment. Such a person cannot be said to have hired or availed the services of the concerned development authority in connection with housing. Mere submission of an application for allotment, which does not result either in allotment or registration and consequent inclusion in the awaiting list for such an allotment, does not confer upon him the status of a consumer as defined under Section 2(1) (d) of the said Act.






National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Delhi Development Authority vs Shri Parveen Kumar & Ors.
on 29 January, 2015

REVISION

PETITION NO.3649 OF 2014 (From the order dated 18-03-2014 in FA No.556 of 2012 of the Punjab State Consumer Disputes RedressalCommission at Chandigarh)

Judgment reserved on 07-01-2015
 Judgment pronounced on 29.01.2015

Thursday, April 6, 2017

complainant is not expected to wait for the delivery of possession of plot for indefinite period



NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
 
REVISION PETITION NO. 499 OF 2017
 
(Against the Order dated 21/11/2016 in Appeal No. 135/2016 of the State Commission Punjab)
1. PUNJABURBAN PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
THROUGH ITS ESTATE OFFICER, BHAGU RAOD, NOW BDA,
BHATINDA
PUNJAB
...........Petitioner(s)
Versus 
1. DARSHANA DEVI
W/O. HARBANSH LAL BANSAL, R/O. HOUSE NO. 19118, STREET NO. 3, BIBIWALA ROAD,
BHATINDA
PUNJAB
...........Respondent(s)


Dated : 28 Mar 201
7



7.         In order to appreciate the learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be useful to have a look on clauses 12, 21 & 22  of the Letter of Intent for allotment dated 26.02.2013 which are reproduced as under:
12. Possession of plot shall be handed over to the allottee after completion of development works at site or 18 months from the date of issue of allotment letter whichever is earlier.
21.           In case terms and conditions of the letter of intent, as detailed above are acceptable, allottee is required to send his / her acceptance by registered post along with a demand draft of 15% price of the plot within 30 days of issue of Letter of intent ( excluding date of issue) subject to the conditions.
22.            In case of refusal to accept the offer, such refusal in writing through a registered post should be received within 30 days from the date of issue of Letter of Intent, 10% amount of earnest money shall be forfeited.  In the event, such refusal is received after a period of 30 days from the issue of Letter of Intent, entire earnest money deposited shall be forfeited.”


8.         No doubt, clause 12 of Letter of Intent do provide that the possession of the plot shall be handed over to the allottee after the completion of the development work at the site or within 18 months from the date of issue of allotment letter, whichever is earlier.  It is also true that neither the development work has been completed as yet nor any allotment letter has been issued in favour of the complainant who deposited the demanded 15% of the consideration amount in furtherance of Letter of Intent.  The question is does this mean that by providing the stipulation in clause 12, 21 & 22 of Letter of Intent, the opposite party can delay the delivery of possession of subject plot to the complainant for indefinite period?  Our answer to the question if a firm ‘No’.  Admittedly, by giving a lure of allotment of plot to the complainant, the petitioner opposite party has received 25% of the agreed consideration amount from the complainant way back in April 2013.  Till date no allotment letter has been issued in favour of the complainant.  On our query, learned counsel for the complainant stated that development work at the site is not yet complete. From this it is evident that petitioner has obtained 25% of the consideration amount about four years back and till date the petitioner is not in a position to deliver possession of the plot to the complainant.  The complainant is not expected to wait for the delivery of possession of plot for indefinite period.  The aforesaid conduct of the opposite party in itself amounts to unfair trade practice by which they are utilizing the money belonging to the gullible consumers without making a serious effort to ensure that the promised possession of the plot is delivered within a reasonable period.   The stipulation to the effect that possession shall be delivered within 18 months of the issue of allotment letter gives a clear indication that impression was given to the consumers that possession of the plot would be delivered within a reasonable period i.e. 2-2 ½ years, which implied promise has not been fulfilled by the opposite party.  Therefore, we do not find any reason to differ with concurrent finding of the Fora below that petitioner opposite party is guilty of deficiency in service bordering unfair trade practice.

Supreme Court : A party cannot claim anything more than what is covered by the terms of contract




Hon’ble Supreme Court has interalia held in the matter of Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation V. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn Ltd. (2013) 5 SCC 470,  as under:

A party cannot claim anything more than what is covered by the terms of contract for the reason that contract is a transaction between the two parties and has been entered into with open eyes and understanding the nature of contract.  Thus, contract being a creature of an agreement between two or more parties has to be interpreted giving literal meanings unless, there is some ambiguity therein.  The contract is to be interpreted giving the actual meaning to the words contained in the contract and it is not permissible for the Court to make a new contract, however reasonable, if the parties have not made it themselves.  It is to be interpreted in such a way that its terms may not be varied.  The contract has to be interpreted without any outside aid. The terms of contract have to be construed strictly without altering the nature of the contract, as it may affect the interest of either of the parties adversely.  ( Vide United India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. harchand Rai Chandan Lal (2004) 8 SCC 644; AIR 2004 SC 4794) and Polymat India ( P) Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [ (2005) 9 SCC 174; Air 2005 SC 286].”

Friday, March 24, 2017

Presumption of due service of notice U/S 138 NI Act _


in N Paraeswaran Unni vs G Kannan, has held that a reminder notice to the drawer of the cheque cannot be construed as an admission of non-service of the first notice by the complainant....


the apex court bench comprising Justice NV Ramana and Justice Prafulla C Pant observed that it is settled law that when a notice is sent by registered post and is returned with postal endorsement “refused” or “not available in the house” or “house locked” or “shop closed” or “addressee not in station”, due service has to be presumed....

Read more at: http://www.livelaw.in/cheque-bounce-reminder-notice-cant-construed-admission-non-service-first-notice-sc/

Wednesday, March 22, 2017

NCDRC _making false and incorrect statements and denial of each and every sentence without any justifiable ground _requires to be controlled




...................... It should be borne in mind  that Consumer Fora are required to decide the matter  speedily  and render equitable justice to the consumer.  The practice of making false and incorrect statements and the practice of denial of each and every sentence submitted by the claimant/complainant without any justifiable ground,  requires to be controlled.  For false affidavits or misleading statements in a pending proceedings deponents are required to be dealt appropriately by imposing punitive damages so that in future they or others may not indulge in such practice.


NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

CIRCUIT BENCH AT BANGALORE
in

REVISION PETITION No. 53 of  2006 

Reliance India Mobile Ltd.    Versus              Hari Chand Gupta Dated the   8th   May,  2006

Friday, March 17, 2017

revision under Section 115 of C P C to be maintainable against an order passed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

......................................................................................................................................................................................................

21. In the case of ITI Ltd. (supra), the question which fell for consideration before the Supreme Court was regarding the maintainability of a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 before the High Court against an order passed by a Civil Court in an appeal preferred under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, specially, when a Second Appeal was statutorily barred under the Act and the Code of Civil Procedure was not specifically made applicable. Thus, the question was quite similar to the one referred to us. The Supreme Court opined in paragraph 10 as under:- 

"...It is true in the present Act application of the Code is not specifically provided for but what is to be noted is: is there an express prohibition against the application of the Code to a proceeding arising out of the Act before a Civil Court? We find no such specific exclusion of the Code in the present Act. When there is no express exclusion, we cannot by inference hold that the Code is not applicable." 

21.1 Rendering a concurring judgment in the said case D.M. Dharmadhikari, J of the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 19 thereof thus: 

"...when a special Act on matters governed by that Act confers a jurisdiction on an established court, as distinguished from a persona designata, without any words of limitation, then the ordinary incident of procedure of that court including right of appeal or revision against its decision is attracted..." 

21.2 Based on the aforesaid reasoning and following the judgments already referred earlier, the Supreme Court held a revision under Section 115 of C P C to be maintainable against an order passed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 
.............................................................................................................................................................................................


HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH 

CRIMINAL REVISION No. 582 of 2016 

Dinesh Kumar Yadav 
Vs 
State Of U.P. & Anr. 

Hon'ble Dilip B. Bhosale, Chief Justice 
Hon'ble Aditya Nath Mittal, J. 
Hon'ble Rajan Roy, J. 
(Per Hon'ble Dilip B Bhosale, CJ) 

Date:27th October, 2016 

Wednesday, March 1, 2017

NCDRC :Meaning of "for the purpose of earning his livelihood"


6.       On perusal of the complaint it appears that it is not the case in which the complainants have hired or availed the services of the opposite parties exclusively for the purpose of earning livelihood by means of self-employment. The following allegations in the complaint support our view: -


“The Complainant No.l, offers various diagnostic services from his abovementioned clinic which was set up in the year 1994.The Complainant No.l offers the following services viz: Digital X-ray, Digital Sonography, Whole Body Colour Doppler Sonography, 2D Colour Echo Cardiography, Digital OPG, Digital Lateral Cephalogram, 3D & 4D Sonography and various other pathology services.
      The Complainant No.l has a staff of 10 people in the said clinic. The said staff also includes one associate Doctor. The said clinic of the Complainant No.l admeasured only 850 Sq.ft. and was insufficient for carrying on various activities listed above.  Further there was no facility in Goregaon (W) area which    provided for C.T. Scan and M.R.I. in the year 2003. The Complainant No.l being Radiologist saw this as an opportunity  to establish a state of the art Radiology Centre in Goregaon (West). For the said purpose complainant’s existing clinic was wholly insufficient as the set up for a C.T. Scan requires atleast 500 Sq.ft. area and set up for M.R.I. requires atleast 800 Sq.ft.”

7.       On reading of the above, it is clear that complainant No.1 is a Radiologist having a clinic with a staff of 10 persons including associate Doctors. Thus, it is clear that before hiring or availing the services of the opposite parties, complaint No.1 was running business of Radiologist with the assistance of associate Doctors and support staff. This clearly indicates that the complainant No.1 was not only earning livelihood before booking of the commercial premises but he was also providing employment to 10 persons. That being the case, the case of the complainants does not fall within the explanation to Section 2 (1) (d) of the Act. In aforesaid view, we are supported by the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Lakshmi Engineering Works vs. P.S. G. Industrial Institute (1995) 3 SCC 583. Relevant observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court reads as under: -

          “The explanation excludes certain purposes from the purview of the expression "commercial purpose" - a case of exception to an exception. Let us elaborate: a person who buys a typewriter or a car and uses them for his personal use is certainly a consumer but a person who buys a typewriter or a car for typing others' work for consideration or for plying the car as a taxi can be said to be using the typewriter/car for a commercial purpose. The explanation however clarifies that in certain situations, purchase of goods for "commercial purpose" would not yet take the purchaser out of the definition of expression "consumer". If the commercial use is by the purchaser himself for the purpose of earing his livelihood by means of self-employment, such purchaser of goods is yet a "consumer". In the illustration given above, if the purchaser himself works on typewriter or plies the car as a taxi himself, he does not cease to be a consumer. In other words, if the buyer of goods uses them himself, i.e., by self- employment, for earning his livelihood, it would not be treated as a "commercial purpose" and he does not cease to be a consumer for the purposes of the Act. The explanation reduces the question, what is a "commercial purpose", to a question of fact to be decided in the facts of each case. It is not the value of the goods that matters but the purpose to which the goods bought are put to. The several words employed in the explanation, viz., "uses them by himself", "exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood" and "by means of self-employment" make the intention of Parliament abundantly clear, that the goods bought must be used by the buyer himself, by employing himself for earning his livelihood. A few more illustrations would serve to emphasis what we say. A person who purchases an auto-rickshaw to ply it himself on hire for earning his livelihood would be a consumer. Similarly, a purchaser of a truck who purchases it for plying it as a public carrier by himself would be a consumer. A person who purchases a lathe machine or other machine to operate it himself for earning his livelihood would be a consumer. (In the above illustrations, if such buyer takes the assistance of one or two persons to assist/help him in operating the vehicle or machinery, he does not cease to be a consumer.) As against this a person who purchases an auto-rickshaw, a car or a lathe machine or other machine to be plied or operated exclusively by another person would not be a consumer. This is the necessary limitation flowing from the expressions "used by him", and "by means of self-employment" in the explanation. The ambiguity in the meaning of the words "for the purpose of earning his livelihood" is explained and clarified by the other two sets of words.


NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
CONSUMER CASE NO. 2121 OF 2016

DOD 
Dated : 23 Feb 2017

Source 
http://cms.nic.in/ncdrcusersWeb/GetJudgement.do?method=GetJudgement&caseidin=0%2F0%2FCC%2F2121%2F2016&dtofhearing=2017-02-23


6.     In order to get benefit of the Explanation, the complainants are required to prove that they had booked the units in question exclusively for the purpose of earning livelihood by way of self-employment.  The use of the word ‘earning livelihood’ makes it clear that the benefit of the Explanation can be extended only to a natural person and not to a distinct person.  The complainants admittedly are private limited companies.  Therefore, the restricted definition of “Commercial Purpose” given in the Explanation cannot be extended to them.  Otherwise also, in paragraph 1 of the respective complaints, it is categorically stated that the complainants companies at the time of booking of the units were already engaged in profitable business albeit in rented accommodation.  Therefore, it cannot be said that the commercial units which are subject matter of the complaints were booked exclusively for the purpose of earning livelihood by way of self-employment.  Thus, by no stretch of imagination, the benefit of Explanation can be extended to the complainants.

In

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
 
CONSUMER CASE NO. 1157 OF 2016
 
1. BLB LTD. & ANR.
Through Its Director, Sh. Vikram Rathi 3rd, Floor, ECE House, Annexe-II, 28A, K.G. Marg,
New Delhi - 110 001.
...........Complainant(s)
Versus 
1. K.K. PROJECTS
Through Its Partners, 6/3, LGF East Patel Nagar,
New Delhi
2. Sri. Sharadamba Properties Ltd.,,
Through Its Director, Sh. Vikram Rathi, 3rd Floor, ECE House, Annexe-II, 28A, K.G. Marg,
New Delhi - 110 001.



SOURCE :
http://cms.nic.in/ncdrcusersWeb/GetJudgement.do?method=GetJudgement&caseidin=0%2F0%2FCC%2F1157%2F2016&dtofhearing=2016-08-05

...........Opp.Party(s)

Dated : 05 Aug 2016

purchase of more than one flat not per se “commercial purpose”


".................. This Commission in Kavit Ahuja Versus Shipra Estate Ltd. & Jaikrishna Estate Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., I (2016) CPJ 31 (NC) has laid down that merely because the Complainant has booked three flats, it cannot be said that it is for commercial purpose, and that the Complainant falls within the definition of “Consumer” within Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. The purchase can be said to be for a commercial purpose only when it is shown that the purchaser is engaged in the business of purchasing and selling houses/plots on a regular basis, solely with the view to make profit by sale of such houses. Without expressing final opinion, I am of the prima facie view that unless it is shown by bringing on record, some cogent material that a purchaser is engaged in the purchase and sale of flats/ houses on regular basis with a view to make profit by such sale, a mere purchase of more than one flat would not per se be sufficient to hold that the purchase was for “commercial purpose”. It is manifest from the order that after the pleadings and evidence has been brought on record, the fora would decide the question on its jurisdiction to entertain Complaints, before proceeding to deal with the rival stands of the claims made in the Complaints. This Commission also dealt with this aspect of purchase of more than one flat, whether it can be construed as commercial purpose or not in another decision dated 21.07.2015 in First Appeal No. 531 of 2015 betweenSai Everest Developers & Anr. Vs. Harbans Singh Kohli & Ors. The aforementioned law laid down by this commission establishes that onus to prove whether the purchase of houses is for commercial purpose or not shifts to the Opposite Party and in the instant case the State Commission has dismissed the Complaints in limine."

Source

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
 
FIRST APPEAL NO. 115 OF 2017 
 
(Against the Order dated 07/09/2016 in Complaint No. 827/2016 of the State Commission Delhi)

DOD- Dated : 27 Feb 2017

Monday, November 21, 2016

Grounds for revision and appeal : UP Stamp Act

Grounds for revision and appeal :UP Stamp Act

Provisions for both revision and appeal are contained in CHAPTER –VI titled as REFERENCE AND REVISION in THE INDIAN STAMP ACT, 1899 (AS AMENDED AND APPLICABLE IN UTTAR PRADESH) which are as under:

56. Control of, and statement of case to, Chief Controlling Revenue Authority.-

(1) The power exercisable by a Collector under Chapter IV and Chapter V and under clause (a) of the first proviso to Section 26 shall in all cases be subject to the control of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority.

*[(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of this Act, any person including the Government aggrieved by an order of the Collector under Chapter-IV, Chapter-V or under clause (a) of the first proviso to Section 26 may, within 60 days from the date of receipt of such order prefer an appeal against such order to the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, who shall after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard  consider the case and pass such order thereon as he thinks just and proper and the order so passed shall be final.

The Hon’ble Allahabad High Court on 4th January 2013 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 57850 of 2009 titled as Gaurav Aseem Avtej Versus The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, U.P. Allahabad and others has held that both the provisions of revision and appeal are available to an aggrieved person while holding that Sub-section (1-A) of section 56 of the Act as inserted by the U.P. Act No. 38 of 2001 is constitutionally valid. It further held that  If a revision is preferred under sub-section (1) of section 56 of the Act then there is no requirement of deposit of 1/3rd of the disputed amount of deficient stamp duty including interest or penalty, if any while filing an application for grant of interim relief

Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Writ-C No. 1303 of 2012 titled as Shiv Kumar Rungta Vs. State of U.P. and Others on August 31, 2012 said “The revision against the order passed under Section 47-A of the Act is maintained under Section 56 of the Act by virtue of the controlling power exercisable by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority over the Collector in matters under Chapters 4 and 5 of the Act which includes 47-A of the Act. This controlling power has been conferred to check loss of revenue and to secure its enhancement but not to satisfy any disappointment suffered by any individual who is actually not a "person interested or aggrieved. The controlling power of the Chief Revenue Authority under Section 56 of the Act is on the administrative side and not to revise the orders passed by the sub-ordinate authorities, as against the orders of sub-ordinate authorities a remedy of appeal has been separately provided under Section 56 (1-A) of the Act. The legislature normally would not have envisaged for providing two remedies against the orders of the Sub-ordinate authority.”

Grounds for Revision

Since no specific grounds have been stated in the Indian Stamp Act upon which Revision Petition may be preferred, it would be beneficial to see similar provision of CPC, as guiding principles, which says (section 115) that a revision petition lies against any order in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears—

 (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or
 (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or
 (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

Hon’ble Apex Court in Associated Cement Co.Ltd. v. Keshvanand reported as (1998) 1 SCC 687 has said:

It is trite legal position that appellate jurisdiction is coextensive with original court's jurisdiction as for appraisal and appreciation of evidence and reaching findings on facts and appellate court is free to reach its own conclusion on evidence untrammeled by any finding entered by the trial court. Reversional powers on the other hand belong to supervisory jurisdiction of a superior court. While exercising reversional powers the court has to confine to the legality and propriety of the findings and also whether the subordinate court has kept itself within the bounds of its jurisdiction vested in it. Though the difference between the two jurisdictions is subtle, it is quite real and has now become well recognised in legal provinces.

Division bench of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Jugal Kishore vs State Of U. P., Lucknow And Others on 30 October, 1991 citations: AIR 1992 All 194 http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/619092/ with respect to orders passed by the Additional District Magistrate, Finance on merits that the circle did not truly and correctly represent the correct market value of the property has ruled at Para 8 “Under sub-section (2) of Section 56 of the Stamp Act, the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority has been authorised to look into all such matters and pass appropriate orders. A revision is maintainable against the impugned orders”

Hon’ble Apex court in Sri. Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works And ... vs Rangaswamy Chettiar on 26 March, 1980t citations: AIR 1980 SC 1253, (1980) 4 SCC 259, 1980 (12) UJ 610 SC has, at Para 2,  said ["Appeal" and "revision" are expression of common usage in Indian statutes and the distinction between "appellate jurisdiction" & revisional jurisdiction is well know though not well defined. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing, as it were, on law as well as fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. Such jurisdiction may, however, be limited in some way as, for instance has been done in the case of second appeals under the CPC and under some Rent Acts in some States. Ordinarily, again, revisional jurisdiction is analogous to a power of superintendence and may some times be exercised even without its being invoked by a party. The extent of revisional jurisdiction is defined by the statute conferring such jurisdiction. The conferment of revisional jurisdiction is generally for the purpose of keeping tribunals subordinate to the revising tribunal within the bounds of their authority to make them act according to law, according to the procedure established by law and according to well defined principles of justice. Revisional jurisdiction as ordinarily understood with reference to our statutes is always included in appellate jurisdiction but not vice-versa. There are general observations. The question of the extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction has to be considered in each case with reference to the language employed by the state.]

Full Bench of Allahabad High  Court in the case of Shri Ramesh Chandra Srivastava, Kanpur v. State of U.P. and others; 2007 UPTC 335 held that the market value of the property has to be determined with reference to the date on which the document is executed. The valuation cannot be determined straightway on such an assumption that the land is situated in close proximity of abadi area or on the presumption that the land is to be used for a purpose other than the agriculture. As averred above, the Full Bench of this Court has clearly held on the basis of the various provisions of the Stamp Act, that the market value is to be determined with reference to the date on which the document was executed and that any subsequent change in the nature or use of the land which may result in the enhancement of the market value of the property was not to be taken into account.

Grounds for appeal:

In the grounds of objection against a finding of fact it has to be shown, how the decision arrived at by the lower court is against the weight of evidence, how the facts and circumstances require it to be altered and make it erroneous. Errors of law may also be pointed out. The grounds should be consistent with the case put up in the Lower Court. No new plea/ground, not taken in the pleadings and on which no issue was framed nor evidence was led, should be raised unless it is a pure question  of law or a point which goes to the root of the case, e. a. question of jurisdiction or res judicata etc [Mogha’s law of pleading]

fact recorded by the courts below are perverse, being based on no evidence and  have been recorded by a misapplication of the law.


HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
Court No. - 34 

Case :- WRIT - C No. - 1410 of 2014 

Petitioner :- Srinath Giri 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Ors. 

Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashwini Kumar Srivastava,Ganesh Shankar Srivastava 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. 


Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J. 

1.    Counsel for parties agreed that since a pure question of law has been raised, this matter may be decided at this stage under the Rules of the Court and respondents do not propose to file any counter affidavit. 

2.    Petitioner's application for grant of interim relief in Revision No. 9 of 2013 preferred under Section 56 of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1899") has been declined  by the Additional Commissioner (Administration), Varanasi Mandal, Varanasi by order dated 16.12.2013 only on the ground that Revisionist has not adduced any evidence of deposit of 1/3rd of disputed amount in the Treasury. 

3.    A Full Bench of this Court in Gaurav Aseem Avtej Vs. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, U.P. and Others 2013 (1) ADJ 442, while considering the constitutional validity of amendment made in Section 56 of Act, 1899 vide U.P. Act No. 38 of 2001, has clearly held that by insertion of Section 1-A in Section 56, Sub-Section (1) is not stand deleted. If a revision is preferred under Section (1) of Section 56, there is no requirement of deposit of 1/3rd of the disputed amount of deficient stamp duty including interest or penalty, while filing application for grant of interim relief. While answering the question no. 2 referred to Full Bench, it said: 

"(2) If a revision is preferred under sub-Section (1) of Section 56 of Act then there is no requirement of deposit of 1/3rd of the disputed amount of deficient stamp duty including interest or penalty, if any while filing an application for grant of interim relief." 

4.    In the present case, the Revisional Court has totally misdirected itself by not looking into the aforesaid law laid down by Full Bench of this Court as long back as on 4.1.2013 and it is really strange that Revisional Court has not updated itself with the law laid down by this Court long back with respect to manner in which appeals and revisional are to be filed and entertained by the authority concerned. 

5.    In the result, the writ petition is allowed. Impugned revisional order dated 16.12.2013, to the extent it has declined to consider the application for interim relief filed by petitioner before Revisional Court, is hereby quashed. Revisional Court is directed to consider petitioner's application for interim relief in accordance with law and pass appropriate order expeditiously, and, in any case, within one month from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. 


Dt. 10.01.2014 

Monday, November 14, 2016

Judicial precedent: Reason is must for not following judgment of another high court



The decision of a high court is at best a persuasive precedent, which another high court is free not to follow. That applies to this Court too. The decisions of other high courts, even though rendered by an Hon'ble Division Bench, is not binding on a Single Bench of this Court. This is the easy route for not following a decision of another high court. However, it is not proper to side track a decision of another high court on the same point by saying that it is not binding. After all, it is a decision of a high court and every decision of high courts deserve due and meticulous consideration. Should a Bench feel not to be persuaded by a persuasive precedent, some reason ought to be assigned. That is exactly the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2008) 14 SCC 283 : Pradip J. Mehta v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad. In paragraph 23 of the decision, the Supreme Court stressed the need for the high courts to either record its agreement or dissent with the decision of any other high court that is placed before it. It was also stressed that the high court, which differs with the view taken by the other high court, in all fairness, must record its dissent with the reasons therefor. Being bound thereby, this Bench treads the path of assigning reasons for not being ad idem with the decisions in D.J. Exim (supra), Shri Mohan Products (supra) and K.V. Wall Mount Pvt. Ltd. (supra).

Calcutta High Court in Metsil Exports Private Ltd. & Anr vs Punjab National Bank & Anr on 10 November, 2016 source https://indiankanoon.org/doc/70217069/


Although the judgments referred to above, were cited at the bar in the High Court, which were taken note of by the learned Judges of the Bench of the High Court, but without either recording its agreement or dissent answered the two questions referred to it in favour of the Revenue. Judicial decorum, propriety and discipline required that the High Court should, especially in the event of its contra view or dissent, have discussed the aforesaid judgments of the different High Courts and recorded its own reasons for its contra view. We quite see the fact that the judgments given by a High Court are not binding on the other High Court(s), but all the same, they have persuasive value. Another High Court would be within its right to differ with the view taken by the other High Courts but, in all fairness, the High Court should record its dissent with reasons therefor. The judgment of the other High Court, though not binding, have persuasive value which should be taken note of and dissented from by recording its own reasons.


It is well settled that when two interpretations are possible, then invariably, the Court would adopt the interpretation which is in favour of the tax payer and against the Revenue. Reference may be made to the decision in Sneh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi[(2006) 7 SCC 714], of this Court wherein, inter alia, it was observed as under:
"While dealing with a taxing provision, the principle of "Strict Interpretation" should be applied. The Court shall not interpret the statutory provision in such a manner which would create an additional fiscal burden on a person. It would never be done by invoking the provisions of another Act, which are not attracted. It is also trite that while two interpretations are possible, the Court ordinarily would interpret the provisions in favour of a tax-payer and against the Revenue."

Supreme Court of India in Pradip J. Mehta vs Commissioner Of Income ... on 11 April, 2008 source https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1863541/